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QUO WARRANTO
Of all the extraordinary remedies, the practitioner is probably least familiar
with quo warranto--which is not surprising when one recalls the infrequency
of its use and the limited attention given the subject by writers of recent years.
An effort will be made to familiarize the reader with quo warranto in California.
Of necessity our examination must begin with the common law, since the ancient
writ, for better or worse, has not undergone the substantial changes that may be
found in other states.'
History
Blackstone defines quo warranto as "a writ of right for the king, against him
who claims or usurps any office, franchise or liberty, to inquire by what authority
he supports his claim, in order to determine the right." 2 At first this remedy was
civil,3 and if a judgment were rendered for the king there was either a seizure
by the crown or a judgment of ouster to eject the usurper; 4 but in no event would
a fine or punishment be infficted. Centuries later the writ fell into disuse, but
in its place grew up an "information in the nature of quo warranto" which
originally was a method of criminal prosecution that not only ousted and seized,
but also imposed a fine.s In time the information again became a civil proceed-
ing to try the right to a franchise or office.6
Scope
Section 803 of the Code of Civil Procedure7 provides that the action in quo
warranto
may be brought by the attoney-general.... upon his own information, or upon
a complaint of a private party, against any person who usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises any public offce,... or any franchise, or against
any corporation,... which usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises
any franchise, within thus state.
branch of government does not exist for the convenience of judges or even attorneys, but
to dispose justly of controversies between litigants. When a petition for a writ is denied
without opinion, the petitioner understandably feels himself short-changed, and probably
takes his petition to a higher court to vindicate his wrath at an outrage to justice. If the
petitioner were given an adequate reason for the demal of the writ, undoubtedly he would
be less-likely to appeal, and perhaps the ultimate result of the written opimon would be to
conserve rather than to consume the time of the court. The written opimon would also
perform the additional function of helping to establish needed precedent in an area in which
virtually all the principles of equity apply, thereby increasing predictability in writ- proceed-
ings.
* Member, Second Year Class.
i5 BANCROFT, CODE PRACTICE AND REMEDIES § 4110 (1928)
'3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *262.
' State ex rel. City of St. Petersburg v. Noel, 114 Fla. 175, 154 So. 214 (1934).
'State v. Askley, 1 Ark. 279 (1839). See generally HIGH, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES
§592 (3d ed. 1896).
"Ames v. Kansas ex rel. Johnston, 111 U. S. 49 (1883). See generally 6 CONSTANTINEAU,
DE FACTO DOCTRINE 637 (1910).
'People ex rel. Attorney General v. Dashaway Ass'n, 84 Cal. 114, 24 Pac. 227 (1890).
'While the Code of Civil Procedure does not refer to this action as "quo warranto,
the term is commonly used by courts and lawyers. See 3 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PRocEounE
Extraordinary Writs § 2 (1954).
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The cases leave no doubt that quo warranto is the proper method by which
title to public office may be tried.8 The courts require that the incumbent be
de facto in office,9 exercising some of the sovereign powers of government.'0 Since.
the primary purpose of the proceeding is to oust the defendant, if he voluntarily
surrenders the challenged office after the proceeding has commenced, abatement
will usually result."
Whenever an action challenges a public office the courts may also determine
the right of any person claimed entitled by the attorney general in the complaint,1
2
yet the incumbent is not permitted to attack the relator's right."3 He may defend
only by proving the authority by which he claims the office. In the event judg-
ment is rendered in favor of the relator he may recover any damages he has
sustained and proceed to execute the office.14 In such a case the defendant must
pay the costs and the court may in its discretion impose a fine.' s If the defendant
should continue to exercise the office all future acts done under color of office
would be void and he would be in contempt.16
It is by quo warranto that the attorney general may oust a private corporation
from its franchise rights. The writ is available for this purpose independent of
the criminal law; institution of a criminal prosecution does not bar quo warranto
nor does the writ bar a criminal action. 17 It is to be noted that unlike the action
challenging an office there is no requirement that the corporation be public, and
consequently the scope and control of the writ can have far-reaching results.'8
However, the use of the writ is limited to situations where there is a continuing
and substantial act which constitutes a clear violation of the franchise. 9
Quo warranto is also the exclusive remedy against the improper exercise of
a municipal corporation's authority.20 It is employed most often to challenge
S Stout v. Democratic County Cent. Comm'n, 40 Cal. 2d 91. 251 P.2d 321 (1952);.
Barendt v. McCarthy, 160 Cal. 680, 118 Pac. 228 (1911) ; People ex rel. Swift v. Bingham,
82 Cal. 238, 22 Pac. 1039 (1889) ; Hull v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. 174, 11 Pac. Coast L. J. 25
(1883) ; Satterlee v. San Francisco, 23 Cal. 314 (1863) ; People ex rel. Smith v. Olds, 3 Cal.
167 (1853) ; Klose v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 2d 913, 217 P. 2d 97 (1950).
'See Jarrett, De Facto Public Officers, 9 So. CAL. L. REv. 189, 212 (1936).
" Stout v. Democratic County Cent. Comm'n, 40 Cal. 2d 91, 251 P. 2d 321 (1952) (party
committeeman not such an officer).
U People v. Muehe, 114 Cal. App. 739, 300 Pac. 829 (1931) (abatement results); People
ex rel. Drew v. Rodgers, 118 Cal. 393, 46 Pac. 740, 50 Pac. 668 (1897) (action not dismissed
even though office is abolished before trial, as defendant may still be fined and claimant may
receive damages as provided by §§ 807 and 809 of the Code of Civil Procedure).
U CAL. CODE Clv. Paoc. §§ 804-05.
' People e rel. Bledsoe v. Campbell, 138 Cal. 11, 70 Pac. 918 (1902).
"C CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. §§ 806-07.
' CAL. CODE CIV. Paoc. § 809.
"
8Ex parte Henshaw, 73 Cal. 486, 15 Pac. 110 (1887); 6 CONSTANTINEAu, DE FACTO
DocnuNE 653 (1910).
" See 28 CAL. S. BAR J. 89 (1953).
See, e.g., People v. White Circle League of America, 408 Ill. 564, 97 N. E. 2d 811
(1951) (non-profit corporation ousted for circulating inflammatory publications attacking
negroes). See also Comment, CALIF. L. Rev. 120 (1923) (unlawful practice of law).
Hicr, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 649.
'Gurtz v. City of San Bruno, 8 Cal. App. 2d 399, 48 P. 2d 142 (1935).
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the annexation proceedings of a city. Before these proceedings are complete any
private person may test their validity by a petition in mandate or certiorari, but
after they become complete, a corporation de facto is deemed created, which may
be attacked only by quo warranto.21
In 1937 the legislature enacted section 811 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which permits an action of quo warranto to be maintained by "the board of
supervisors of any county or city and county or the legislative body of any
municipal corporation" against a party intruding unlawfully into their territorial
limits. This step toward modernization was favorably received by the writers
because the attorney general was understandably cautious in exercising his pre-
rogative, and frequently time was wasted informing him of the facts. 22 Also it
relieved the busy state machinery from the burden of acting and permitted a well
informed local body to right a wrong done to itself.23
Effects
A peculiarity of quo warranto is that the burden of proof may be shifted
from the plaintiff to the defendant.24 The state may charge usurpation in general
terms and require the defendant to allege and prove his right to the privilege in
question. While this practice has been frequently criticized, the California
Supreme Court has never rejected it,25 probably because the state may allege
(as is commonly done) specific grounds and thereby assume the burden of
proof.26
Another peculiarity of the writ is that neither lapse of time,27 the conduct2
and stipulations 9 made by the relator, nor even prior judgments against the
relator"° will be binding upon the people. So, as a general rule it may be said
that no statute of limitation or doctrine of estoppel will tie the hands of the state.
Since quo warranto is a civil action, a new trial may be granted according
to the ordinary rules and an appeal may be taken to the district court of appeals.3
But the relator is not entitled to appeal from a judgment in favor of the defendant
without approval from the attorney general; an attempted appeal would be
"ineffectual." 32 Yet, an intervener who unites with the defendant in resisting the
'American Distilling Co. v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 660, 213 P. 2d 704 (1950) ; People
ex rel. Mosk v. City of Santa Barbara, 192 Cal. App. 2d 342, 13 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1961);
People v. Clemons, 182 Cal. App. 2d 808, 6 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1960).
= CAL. S. BAR J., March 1938, p. 32.
Work of the 1937 Legislature, 11 So. CAL. L. Rv. 50 (1938).
People v. Reclamation Dist. No. 136, 121 Cal. 522, 50 Pac. 1068, 53 Pac. 1085 (1898);
People ex rel. Attorney General v. Dashaway Ass'n, 84 Cal. 114, 24 Pac. 277 (1890) ; People
ex rel. Palmer v. Woodbury, 14 Cal. 43 (1859).
People ex rel. Stephenson v. Hayden, 9 Cal. App. 2d 312, 49 P. 2d 314 (1935).
Cf. People ex rel. Skelton v. Los Angeles, 133 Cal. 338, 65 Pac. 749 (1901).
People v. Bailey, 30 Cal. App. 581, 158 Pac. 1036 (1916).
'4People ex rel. Leavitt v. Bass, 15 Cal. App. 62, 113 Pac. 695 (1910).
'4People ex rel. Budd v. Holden, 28 Cal. 123 (1865).
People ex rel. Drew v. Rodgers, 118 Cal. 393, 46 Pac. 740 (1897).
CAL. CoN s. art. VI, § 4b; People v. City of Oakland, 123 Cal. 145, 55 Pac. 772 (1898).
"CAL. ADm. CODE tit. 11, ch. 1; People v. Reclamation Dist. No. 136, 121 Cal. 522, 50
Pac. 1068, 53 Pac. 1085 (1898); People ex rel. Cage v. Petroleum Rectifying Co., 21
Cal. App. 2d 289, 68 P. 2d 984 (1937).
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charges may avail himself of appeal and any other procedural practices, as can
the defendant. 33 In most instances the perfecting of an appeal (where permitted)
stays proceedings in the lower court upon the judgment or order appealed from;
however, the appeal does not stay proceedings without a writ of supersedeas
where it adjudges the defendant a usurper of a public office.34
The Attorney General's Discretion
Under the Administrative Code's a private party, whether personally inter-
ested or not, must submit an application for "leave to sue" to the attorney general.
If the application is approved the relator must use the complaint accepted and
he may not make changes without the attorney general's approval. Further, the
code obligates the relator to keep the attorney general constantly informed on
all motions, filings and the like, thereby subjecting him to restrictive influence
even when his application is approved. At any time during the proceeding the
attorney general may discontinue, dismiss or assume the management of the suit
and by so doing thwart the relator who may have already expended considerable
time and money.
Since the relator's application and the final decision are handled exclusively
by the office of the attorney general, 6 the situation presents an opportunity for
abuse, though no such instance can be found. There may be a warning in the
fact that although quo warranto is a relatively uncommon remedy, denials of
"leave to sue" have been repeatedly issued in recent years, not only in the more
common annexation proceedings,37 but also in applications to test title to public
office.38
Protection against capricious action by the attorney general should be avail-
able in the form of mandamus, which is an appropriate action to correct abuse
of discretion by a government officer 3 9 However, it appears that mandamus has
never been issued to force the attorney general to bring an action in quo warranto.
Only limited judicial attention has been directed to this subject; until recently
only one case in California had discussed the matter of the attorney general's
discretion.
In that case, Lamb v. Webb,40 a disappointed candidate for the office of county
People ez rel. Fogg v. Perris Irrigation Dist., 132 Cal. 289, 64 Pac. 399 (1901).
CAL. CODE Civ. PIoc. § 949; Day v. Gunning, 125 Cal. 527, 58 Pac. 172 (1899) (not
applicable when removal is because of malfeasance) ; Ex parte Henshaw, 73 Cal. 486, 15 Pac.
110 (1887); Covarrubias v. Board of Supervisors, 52 Cal. 622 (1878). Compare Foster v.
Superior Court, 115 Cal. 279, 47 Pac. 58 (1896) (action stayed by appeal if office is not
public).
"CAL. ADm. CODE tit. 11, ch. 1 (1945).
1 OPs. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. Foreword (1943).
"40 Ops. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 78 (1962) ; 39 Ops. CAL. ATf'y GEN. 85 (1962) ; 35 O's. CAL.
AT'y GEN. 115 (1960) ; 29 Ops. CAL. AT'Y GEN. 204 (1957) ; 26 OPs. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 201
(1955) ; 26 Ops. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 180 (1955); 25 Ops. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 107 (1955); 24
Ops. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 254 (1954) ; 24 OPs. CAL. ATT'y GEN. 74 (1954) ; 23 Ops. CAL. ATT'Y
GEN. 300 (1954).
"30 Ops. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 319 (1957) (mayor) ; 25 O's. CAL. ATT'y GEN. 223 (1955)
(city council); 12 Ops. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 340 (1948) (city judge) ; 8 Ops. CAL. ATVY GEN.
221 (1946) (city supervisor).
"See Inglin v. Hoppin, 156 Cal. 483, 105 Pac. 582 (1909).
'o 151 Cal. 451, 91 Pac. 102 (1907).
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supervisor applied to the attorney general for leave to sue his successful opponent
in quo warranto. Upon denial of his application he petitioned for a writ of man-
damus to compel the attorney general to grant leave to sue under section 803
of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads:
[T]he attorney-general must bring the action, whenever he has reason to believe
that any such office or franchise has been usurped, . .. or when he is directed
to do so by the governor.
The court ducked the question whether section 803 gave it power to review the
exercise of discretion by the attorney general. The petition was denied on the
ground that there had been no abuse, the court saying:
Clearly ... this was not a sufficient showing to warrant a court in holding that
the attorney-general ought to have been convinced that he had 'reason to believe'
that [the incumbent] had unlawfully intruded into and usurped [the] office
of supervisor."
Recently, in City of Campbell v. Mosk,42 the subject was again discussed, and
the court expressly recognized that the attorney general's action in denying leave
to sue is subject to review. The appellant city sought leave to sue the City of San
Jose, which had allegedly annexed inhabitated territory adjacent to the two
municipalities by the less formal procedure provided for annexing uninhabitated
territory. When the attorney general rejected the application, the applicant peti-
tioned the superior court for a writ of mandamus to compel the granting of leave
to sue. The superior court sustained the attorney general's demurrer and on
appeal the district court of appeals affirmed the judgment; however, it rejected
the attorney general's argument that a court should never compel him to grant
leave to sue in quo warranto. The court said:
[W]e believe that there reposes in the Attorney General the right to exercise
discretion in permitting the institution of suit in quo warranto. Only in the event
of an extreme abuse will the courts intervene to set aside the result of the
exercise of such discretion."
While the court stated it intended to "define the nature of the obligations of
the Attorney General to grant such leave," 44 it does not appear to have reached
that goal. Further, the opinion does not consider whether the attorney general
had "reason to believe" 45 that Campbell's franchise had been usurped. Instead,
the decision was based on the broad ground that suit by the appellant "would
not promote the public interest. '46
The decision in City of Campbell is probably sound,47 for it is not unreason-
" Id. at 456, 91 Pac. at 104.
2197 Cal. App. 2d 640, 17 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1961).
"Id. at 642, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 585.
"Ibid.
See CAL. CODE Cirv. PRoc. § 803.
City of Campbell v. Mosk, 197 Cal. App. 2d 640, 648, 17 Cal. Rptr. 584, 589 (1961).
The grounds given to reach this conclusion are to be noted. For example, (1) suit would
involve three governmental agencies, and (2) only the appellant objected to the annexation.
"The court pointed out that the statutory scheme for annexation has many built-in pro-
tections against abuse, none of which was utilized by the appellant prior to completion of the
annexation proceedings. For this reason the case was probably a poor sounding board for
a discussion on the nature of the attorney general's discretion.
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able to allow a state officer to be an arbitrator in a dispute between two munici-
palities. However the broad ground on which the decision rests contains disquiet-
ing implications for a case where the rights of an individual claimant are at
stake, and his only means of relief is quo warranto. Clearly, a court should not
employ this "public interest" rationale of City of Campbell to deny the right of
a claimant to public office to sue in quo warranto, in a case in which the attorney
general does have "reason to believe" that the office has been usurped.
Procedures in Other States
Many states permit the relator to make application where the attorney general
has refused to bring quo warranto, provided that he has an interest in that which
he challenges.48 Such a procedure permits the relator who is wronged in his
private rights to avoid the necessity of resorting to a mandamus proceeding and
does not permit the individual to correct a wrong common only to the public. 49
The decisions in the states that permit the interested party to maintain the action
on his own relation differ as to what constitutes sufficient personal interest. Some
limit the proceeding to a claim to office, while others liberally permit any tax-
payer to maintain the action. It would appear wise to construe narrowly the
elements constituting sufficient personal interest, in order to protect public offi-
cials from frequent unmerited attacks that might discourage capable men from
seeking public office.50
Another excellent procedure places the burden of proof on the relator if he
comes in on his own relation, thereby assuring that the determination is of pri-
vate rights.5 ' Such legislation not only allows a liberal method of determining
the claim, but also permits the courts to decide if the action should be maintained
in the first instance.52
Finally, it would seem wise to prohibit the attorney general from dismissing
the action, even under our existing law, once he has given the relator the green
light.53
'People ex Tel. Barton v. Londoner, 13 Colo. 303, 22 Pac. 764 (1889) ; Clarke v. Long,
152 Ga. 619, 111 S. E. 31 (1922) ; Rowan v. City of Shawneetown, 378 111. 289, 38 N. E. 2d
2 (1941) ; State v. Home Brewing Co., 182 Ind. 75 (1914) ; State ex rel. White v. Barker,
116 Iowa 96, 89 N. W. 204 (1902) ; Vrooman v. Michie, 69 Mich. 42, 36 N. W. 749 (1888) ;
State ex rel. Gall v. Barnes, 136 Minn. 438, 162 N. W. 513 (1917) ; Dorris v. Lloyd, 375 Pa.
481, 100 A. 2d 599 (1953) ; Smith v. Reid, 60 S. D. 311, 244 N. W. 353 (1932) ; State ex rel.
Murdock v. Ryan, 41 Utah 327, 125 Pac. 666 (1912); Hammer v. Commonwealth ex rel.
Hoover, 169 Va. 355, 193 S. E. 496 (1937) ; State ex rel. Brown v. Warnock, 12 Wash. 2d
478, 122 P. 2d 472 (1942) ; State ex rel. Morrison v. Freeland, 139 W. Va. 327, 81 S. E. 2d
685 (1954) ; State ex rel. Williams v. Samuelson, 131 Wis. 499, 111 N. W. 712 (1907) ; Note,
33 N. D. L. REv. 98 (1957).
Rowan v. City of Shawneetown, 378 111. 289, 38 N. E. 2d 2 (1941).
Comment, 40 MrNN. L. Rav. 735 (1956).
"Vrooman v. Michie, 69 Mich. 42,36 N. W. 749 (1888).
"See State ex Tel. Morrison v. Freeland, 139 W. Va. 327, 81 S. E. 2d 685 (1954).
"See Limbaugh, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 8 Mo. L. Rhy. 247, 261 (1943). Cf.
People ex rel. Garrison v. Clark, 72 Cal. 289, 13 Pac. 858 (1887) ; People ex Tel. Van Valer
v. Jacobs, 2 Cal. Unrep. 672, 12 Pac. 222 (1886) ; both were actions to set aside a patent for
state swamp land in which the state had no direct interest. Though they were not quo war-
ranto actions the attorney general was held not to have authority to withdraw his permission.
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Conclusion
While other states have modified quo warranto procedure to allow the action
to be brought by private individuals, California has continued to employ the
procedure of the past-basically the same procedure which enabled financially
embarrassed rulers to strengthen the crown by use of the writ. 4 Nevertheless,
since the function of the writ is "to protect the interests of the people as a whole
and guard the public welfare," 5s it is difficult to quarrel with the California
system requiring the action to be brought by the attorney general. However the
position the court has taken in reviewing the attorney general's discretion, as
unfolded in the Campbell case, should not be extended to cases involving the
right of an individual claimant to sue in quo warranto.
Richard C. Turrone*
4 See HIGH, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 679.
State R. R. Comm'n v. People, 44 Colo. 345, 354, 98 Pac. 7, 11 (1908).
* Member, Second Year Class.
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